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Abstract
We study the optimal hiring and ring decisions of a rm under two di¤erent ring
costs regulations: 1) Dual labor markets characterized by high ring costs for workers
with seniority above a threshold ("permanent workers") and by low costs for "temporary
workers". 2) The Single Labor Contract, a policy proposal to make ring costs increasing
in seniority at the job. We focus on the option value implied by the regulations and obtain
some new results: the optimal ring rule is a constant function of workers productivity
only for permanent workers. For temporary workers it varies with seniority at the job
because the rm tries to keep alive the option to re at low cost. In the Dual regulation
the workers more likely to be red are those close to become permanent. On the contrary,
the Single Contract transfers that maximum ring to the new hires. Thus, red workers
are red sooner under the Single Contract. However, if both regulations have the same
average ring cost for workers who become permanent, temporary workers are less likely
to be red in the Single Contract. Moreover, this new regulation increases hiring and
average employment duration. It also reduces turnover among temporary workers, but at
the expense of higher turnover among permanent workers who are more often replaced by
temporary workers.
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1 Introduction
With aggregate unemployment rates reaching double digits in many countries, labor market
reforms are at the center of the economic policy debate. This is especially the case in southern
European countries characterized by "dual labor markets". A concept that describes labor
regulations with two main types of contracts: on one side, permanent contracts protected with
high ring costs; on the other side, temporary contracts with low ring costs that must be
upgraded to permanent when workers seniority at the job reaches a certain threshold.1 These
countries are among those with higher youth unemployment rates (in 2010 about 25% in France
and Italy, more than 40% in Spain), and at least half of their young workers have a temporary
contract (Scarpetta et al. 2010).
Among the di¤erent policy proposals, one seems especially popular: unifying the Dual Labor
regulations into a Single Contract that would have ring costs increasing in seniority at the job.2
For example, Nicolas Sarkozy endorsed the idea during the French 2007 presidential election
(Cheron 2007); in Spain it is in the electoral program of one of the major political parties
(Expansion 2011); in Portugal implementing a version of it was imposed by the EU in the 2011
rescue package (Bentolila 2011).
In this paper we compare the Single Contract and the Dual Labor regulation in a partial
equilibrium model that explicitly takes into account the option value implied by the di¤erent
ring cost regulations. We study the behavior of a rm which can be either active or idle.
Active rms employ a worker and make stochastic prots which can be positive or negative.
They can re their worker at any time and become idle by paying a ring cost.3 If the rm is
idle it does not employ any worker and its prots are zero. An idle rm can hire a worker by
paying a hiring cost and become active (we assume no matching frictions and perfectly elastic
labor supply, i.e. "workers are waiting at the gate").
We model the Dual regulation assuming that the ring cost is a constant if ring happens
before workers seniority reaches a threshold T , and a higher constant if ring happens after T .
For the Single Contract we assume that ring costs start at some positive level and continuously
increase with workers seniority until seniority reaches T: After this threshold the ring cost is
the same constant level than for permanent workers in the Dual Labor.
Under both regulations, to re before T is similar to an American option that gives the
1For example, before the 2010 reforms, in Spain ring costs for temporary contracts (job seniority smaller
than 3 years) were the wage amount of 8 days of work per year of job seniority. Meanwhile for permanent
contracts the costs were the wage amount of 45 days per year of job seniority. The 2010 reform reduced the
ring costs to 12 for temporary workers and to 33 days for permanent.
2There are several proposals of Single Contract that di¤er in their details but share this common element:
Blanchard and Tirole (2003) and Cahuc and Kramarz (2004) for France, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) and Ichino
et al. (2009) for Italy, and a manifesto signed by 100 academic economists (Andrés et al. 2009) for Spain.
3We do not consider xed term contracts that imply zero ring cost at the expiration of the contract.
2
right of ring at low costs.4 This implies that when the option is alive the optimal ring rule
is not only a function of workers productivity, but also of both the time to expiration of the
option, and of the cost of exercising it. Firms with permanent workers do not have that option,
thus their ring behavior only depends on the productivity of the worker. The Dual regulation
and the Single Contract di¤er on the timing of the costs of exercising the option, what changes
radically the rms behavior. In the Dual regulation the workers more likely to be red are those
close to become permanent because the rm tries to keep alive the option to re at low cost.
On the contrary, in the Single Contract the option does not have much value for those workers
because their ring costs are close to those of permanent workers. In the Single Contract the
maximum ring happens with new hires because rms anticipate that the option loses value as
workers seniority increases. Thus, red workers are red sooner under the Single Contract.
We also show that if the regulations share the same average ring cost at T; and the
same protection for permanent workers, then the Single Contract increases hiring and reduces
turnover among temporary workers, but at the expense of higher turnover among permanent
workers who are more often replaced by temporary workers. These results happen because for
any duration strictly shorter than T the Single Contract has lower average and cumulative ring
costs. Thus, higher incentives to both hiring and ring. Overall, the Single Contract generates
a higher average time employed.5
We did comparative statics on the main parameters of the model to check the robustness of
the previous results, and to assess the sensitivity of the two regulations. We noticed that when
rms become more impatient (higher discount factor) the Single Contract generates more ring
of temporary workers than the Dual because the anticipation of future costs plays a higher role
in the Single Contract. And for high levels of risk aversion the Single Contract provides less
incentives to re, especially transitory workers.
Our paper is related to two literatures:
1) The paper uses techniques from the literature of investment under uncertainty (Dixit
and Pindyck 1994 is an early survey, Cetin and Zapatero 2010, Hugonnier and Morellec 2007
or Miao and Wang 2007, are, among others, recent examples). Bertola and Bentolila (1990)
is closely related. They also study a continuous time partial equilibrium labor demand model.
However, their ring and hiring costs are linear and do not imply any option value.
2) By the questions studied, our paper complements the search and matching literature
that has studied Dual Labor markets (for example, Bentolila et al. 2010, Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay 2002, Costain et al. 2011, Dolado et al. 2007 or Sala et al. 2010) and, less intensively,
4An American put option is a nancial contract in which the buyer of the option has the right, but not the
obligation, to sell an agreed nancial instrument, to the seller of the option at any time during the life of the
option for a certain price.
5Our results are qualitative. Our model is too stylized for a full quantitative analysis.
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the Single Contract (Costain et al. 2011, Garcia-Perez 2009, Garcia-Perez and Osuna 2011).
Our main contribution is to show that the option value implicit in the ring regulations makes
the optimal ring of temporary workers a function of seniority at the job. Thus, the ring rule
is not a constant productivity level because the rm tries to keep alive the option to re at low
cost.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 describes the model and Section 3 the solution
method. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 performs comparative statics. Section 6
concludes. Proofs and details of the solution method are in an online Appendix.
2 Model
We analyze an innitely-lived rm in a continuous-time setting. The rm can be in any of
two states: 1) It can be active, employing a worker and receiving a stochastic stream of prots
net of wage costs yt; or 2) it can be idle, have no employee and receive zero net prots. Prots
can take either positive or negative values as they evolve as an arithmetic Brownian motion:
dyt = dt+  dBt (1)
where  is the expected prot growth (in levels) and  is the prot growth volatility. Both 
and  are constant.
An active rm can re the worker at any time but it must pay a ring cost q() that depends
on how long the worker has been employed in the rm (). We focus on two cost functions:
i) The Dual Labor market, where the cost of ring a worker is a step function with two
levels: if the red worker has seniority smaller than a threshold T then the rm has to
pay cost q. If the worker has seniority larger than T then the ring cost is higher (q)
q(t) = q
D(t) =
(
q if t  T
q if t < T
with q > q > 0 (2)
ii) The Single Contract, where ring costs start at some positive level (q0) and increase
linearly with slope q as the worker remains employed. Once seniority attains a threshold
TS the ring cost becomes constant
q(t) =
(
qS(t) = q0 + qt if t  TS
qS = q0 + qTS if t > TS
(3)
q > 0; q0 > 0
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If the rm res its worker it switches to the idle state where net prots are zero. Idle rms
monitor potential prots (yt) and can hire a worker at any time by paying a hiring cost (c). If
they do so they start producing at the next instant. Thus, the rst prot received by an idle
rm that hires a worker at t is yt+"; for innitesimal ":
We assume that the rm has subjective discount rate  and it is risk averse. We follow
the recent nancial literature on rms capital structure (Bhamra et al. 2010 or Chen 2010,
among others) and assume an exogenous stochastic discount factor una¤ected by the rms
ring/hiring policy. The rm maximizes its value by discounting cash-ows with the stochastic
discount factor implied by CARA utility over potential prots:
u(yt) =  1

exp ( yt) ; (4)
where  is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion: This is equivalent to the problem of a
risk-neutral rm whose discount rate is
r =  +    2
2
2
(5)
and whose risk-adjusted expected prot variation is6
 =   2: (6)
Since the rm can decide at each time whether to re or not, prots before ring and hiring
costs (t) can be written as
t = Ityt (7)
where It is an indicator function that takes the value one if the rm has a worker at time t,
6These parameters are obtained by decomposing the stochastic discount factor
e t
u0(yt)
u0(y0)
= e t (yt y0)= e t (t+Bt)= Z0;tH0;t
into the time discount factor Z0;t = e r
t, with r =  +    1222, and the risk-neutral density process
H0;t = e
  122t Bt , with market price of risk  = : The Radon-Nikodym theorem and the Girsanov theorem
imply that
E
Z 1
0
Z0;tH0;ttdt

= E
Z 1
0
Z0;ttdt

where E denotes expectation with respect to the probability measure under which Bt = Bt + t is a standard
Brownian motion (the risk-neutral probability measure). Substituting Bt=Bt   t into the dynamics of prots
t and yt; we obtain the risk-neutral rms value.
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and zero otherwise. Firing means dIt =  1, while hiring implies dIt = 1. Thus t evolves as:
dt = It[dt+ dBt] + ytdIt (8)
The rms problem is to decide the optimal times at which to hire (if the rm is idle) or to
re (if it is active) to maximize its expectation of cumulative discounted cash-ows. We denote
by i the time at which the rm takes those decisions.7 And use the indicator function Ii that
takes the value one when the ring/hiring decision is taken. Then, the problem of the rm
under the risk neutral measure is
V = max
i
E
R1
0
e rttdt
 P1i=1E [e riIiq(i) + (1  Ii)c]
s:t: dt = It[
dt+ dBt] + ytdIt
s:t: dyt = 
dt+ dBt
s:t: q(t) =
(
as in (3) for the Single Contract
as in (2) for the Dual Labor market
(9)
3 Solving the model
Both cost functions (2) and (3) imply that the value of the rms option to re depends on
time, because ring is cheaper if it is done before the employment reaches T or TS: To capture
this feature of the option value we will solve the model using a randomizing approximation
method proposed by Carr (1998) to price American put options with nite maturity. The idea
is to convert the problem into one of an innite-maturity option with a stochastic termination
time.
To describe the method lets assume that T = TS and denote it by TS: Carr (1998) method
partitions the employment time threshold TS into n subintervals and it assumes that TS is not
a deterministic time but a stochastic time denoted by ~T : The random variable ~T has mean TS;
and variance V ar

~T

that converges to zero as n ! 1: Thus, the deterministic case can be
approximated with any accuracy by the stochastic case by increasing n:
We assume that the employment time () starts in the rst time interval and switches
randomly to the next one when it receives a shock distributed as a continuous time Poisson
process with hazard rate n=TS. Thus, the average time expected in the rst interval is TSn and
the variance
 
TS
n
2
: The shocks at di¤erent intervals are i:i:d: Thus, the average time to have
received n shocks is E

~T

= TS; and the variance V ar

~T

is (TS)
2
n
, which converges to zero
7Thus i = 1; : : : ;1. If the rm starts in the idle state, the rm is hiring when i is odd, and it is ring when
i is even.
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as n!1:
We denote by u a state variable that captures how many shocks have happened, or, in other
words, in which interval is the employment time. We can write the ring cost q(; u) as a
function of u since q(; u) gets into the at shape of t > TS only after n shocks:
There are n + 1 intervals (the rst n before TS; plus the one after TS at which ring costs
are constant). Thus, for example, if n = 2 then u = 0; 1 or 2: The variable ut changes over time
depending on the shocks, it evolves as a continuous-time markov chain with intensity n
TS
. For
example, when n = 2 its intensity matrix is264 
2
TS
2
TS
0
0   2
TS
2
TS
0 0 0
375
with the third state being an absorbing state.
We denote by V (It = 1; yt; qt; ut) the value function of a rm employing a worker (It = 1);
receiving prots yt, facing ring cost function qt which depends on the employment duration,
and on interval ut: This rm must decide an optimal time  to re. This optimal time can
be innite. If it res, the rm will get the discounted continuation value of an idle rm
V (It = 0; y; q0; ut = 0). Hence the active rms value is
V (1; yt; qt; u) = max

E
Z 
t
e rsysds  e rq + e rV (0; y; q0; 0)

(10)
The rst term is expected cumulative discounted prots until the time of ring. The second
term captures the ring costs of ring a worker of duration : The third term is the continuation
value.
The optimal  can be expressed as a minimum prot level that triggers ring once attained.
We call this prot level the ring boundary, denoted as y(q; u), which depends on costs q (hence
seniority at the job), and the state variable u which determines whether costs have switched to
constant. For prot values above the boundary the rm prefers to keep the worker. For prots
below the boundary the worker is red and the rm goes idle. Firing occurs the rst time the
prot value y reaches the boundary.
When the rm is idle prots are zero, but it can hire at any time : Its value function is
V (0; yt; q0; 0) = max

E

e rV (1; y; q0; 0)  e rc

(11)
The rst term is the discounted value upon hiring at time  and becoming an active rm. The
second term captures the hiring costs discounted from the hiring time to the present:
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There is a critical level of potential prots y that motivates the rm to hire, we call this the
hiring boundary. It separates an inactivity region where low prots discourage the rm from
hiring, from an activity region, where high prots induce the rm to hire. The hiring boundary
depends on hiring costs, the evolution of the prots process, and on ring costs of the rm
which just hired.
An online Appendix characterize the ring and hiring boundaries for both regulations and
explain our numerical solution. Next section discusses their patterns.
4 Theoretical predictions
In this Section we analyze the qualitative predictions of the model. Our model is too
stylized for a full quantitative analysis. Given the lack of closed form solutions we solve numer-
ically a somewhat plausible parameterization. We checked that the patterns that we discuss
are robust to di¤erent parameterizations. Moreover, in Section 5 we study how changes in the
parameters a¤ect the results.
4.1 Parameterization
Concerning the dynamics of prots (equation 1), we set the deterministic expected prot
increase  to 0:05 and the volatility  to 0:14: If we measure prots in units of $100 millions
this corresponds to a rm experiencing $5 million of expected annual prot increase, with a
standard deviation of $14 millions.8 Concerning the preference parameters, we set the coe¢ cient
of absolute risk aversion  to 3; and the subjective discount rate  to 0:15: Section 5 does
comparative statics on these parameters.
Concerning the ring costs, to focus on the di¤erences between regulations due to di¤erent
shapes of ring costs instead of di¤erent levels, we study the case when both regulations give
the same protection to permanent workers
q = qS (12)
and this maximum protection is attained at the same seniority level
TS = T = T (13)
8This volatility of earnings variation seems conservative for many industries. For example, in the auto sector,
between 1947 and 2007, the average annual variation of real before tax prots was -389 millions (in U.S. dollars
of 2005), while the standard deviation was much higher, $7584 millions (Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA
Tables 6.17 A,B,C,D).
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Moreover, we assume that both regulations imply the same average ring cost for workers
whose seniority is T , that is
q =
1
T
Z T
0
qS()d (14)
As we will discuss below, assumption (14) highlights an important feature of the Single
Contract. Even if it is designed to have the same average cost as the Dual for workers that
become permanent, its cumulative and average costs are necessarily lower for workers hired
before T
1
j
Z j
0
qd >
1
j
Z j
0
qS()d 8 j < T (15)
Panel A of Figure 1, which plots the benchmark ring cost regulations, shows assumptions
(12)  (15).
Insert Figure 1 about here
Concerning the ring cost parameters, we set them as multiples of the daily wage, which
we assume to be 0:05: This implies a monthly wage of around $1500 for a worker generating an
expected annual revenue of $6800 to the rm, if we assume a prot rate of 25% of revenues, and
wage costs of 2/3 of revenues (a rough approximation to the labor share in National Income).9
We assumed q = 45 wage days, and T = 3 given that one period in the model is one year. We
set q0, q and q in order to meet assumptions (12) (15) with a non-negative q0: The hiring cost
(c) does not play an important role in the results, we set it to half of the smallest ring cost
(the initial cost of the single contract). Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parameterization.
Insert Table 1 about here
4.2 Results
An active rm res its worker when the prot level crosses the ring boundary from above.
Hence, a higher ring boundary implies a higher incentive to re. An idle rm hires a worker
when the prot level crosses the hiring boundary from below. A lower hiring boundary implies
a higher incentive to hire.
Panel B of Figure 1 reports the optimal ring and hiring boundaries under both types of
regulations for the benchmark parameterization of Table 1. The regulations imply very di¤erent
ring patterns, and also di¤erent hiring boundaries. First we discuss each regulation separately,
then we compare them:
a) The Dual Labor: for  2 [0; T ] the ring boundary is increasing in seniority at the job,
9We have 0:05 

(6:8+)
0:25  23

=365; i.e. a daily wage of $50:
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as seniority approaches T the rm demands more prots to keep the worker employed.
Thus, most of the incentive to re is concentrated at T: A pattern that is consistent with
the empirical evidence and explained by the option value implicit in the Dual Labor.
Firms like to have the option to re at low cost, and they keep it alive by ring before T .
Once the worker reaches T the option disappears.
The slope of the ring boundary before T is increasing in the gap in ring costs
 
q   q ;
and in how close seniority is of T . The rst e¤ect can be seen in Panel A of Figure 2,
which plots the boundary for a lower value of q while keeping q constant. The higher the
labor protection of the permanent worker relative to the temporary, the higher the value
of keeping alive the option to re at low cost. Moreover, a larger
 
q   q implies more
hiring and more ring around T (the hiring and ring boundaries are closer): This higher
turnover is a "churning e¤ect", once temporary workers get close to T they are red and
(soon) replaced by new hires. The rm incurs ring and hiring cost to keep alive the
option to re cheap.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Panel B of Figure 1 also shows that the ring boundary for permanent workers is at
and lower than for temporary workers. It is at because now there is no option value,
ring costs are constant. It is lower because permanent workers are protected by higher
ring costs.
b) The Single Contract: the maximum of the ring boundary is at the start of employment
( = 0) and the ring boundary decreases in seniority. Two reasons explain these patterns:
1) At  = 0 ring costs are the cheapest. And lower ring costs encourage more ring. 2)
Firing costs are increasing (up to T ) creating an incentive to re before costs become more
expensive. The expected cost increase is maximal at  = 0; and it decreases progressively
to zero as costs are closer to the maximum cost, i.e. as seniority gets closer to T . After T
the ring boundary is at and at its lowest level because costs are constant and at their
maximum level.
Panel B of Figure 2 shows how the slope of the ring boundary depends on the slope of
cost increase q and on how close seniority is to T . It plots ring boundaries for larger
T s and smaller slopes q of ring costs, while keeping unaltered the ring cost after T .
We can see that both the intercept and the average slope of the ring boundary decrease
as T becomes larger. The slower the transition to the highest ring costs the smaller the
anticipation e¤ect, and smaller the incentive to re. The higher q; the higher the initial
incentive to anticipate ring and the faster the boundary decays as employment time goes
by.
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From the previous discussion we can draw two conclusions from comparing both regulations:
i) Relative to the Dual Labor, the Single Contract transfers most of the incentive to
re from the workers with seniority close to T to those just hired. The extent of this
reshaping depends on the rate of cost increase q in the Single Contract. Figure 3 plots a
consequence of this reshaping: the average seniority of red workers is lower in the Single
Contract. This happens for both workers red before (Panel A) and after T (Panel B). As
it is intuitive, workers that started at a higher prot level have on average been employed
more time when red (it took more time for prots to cross the ring boundary).
Insert Figure 3 about here
ii) If the regulations share the same average ring cost at T (condition 14) and the same
protection for permanent workers (condition 12), then the Single Contract generates more
incentive to hire (lower hiring boundary) and higher turnover among permanent workers
(the ring boundary for permanent worker is higher and its distance from the hiring
boundary is smaller): Figure 4 conrms these results. Panel A shows that an unemployed
worker has a higher probability of being hired under the Single Contract. Panel B shows
that for di¤erent levels of rm protability the Single Contract has a slightly higher
probability of ring a permanent worker. Panel C shows that the Single Contract has
lower probability of ring a transitory worker except for workers starting in very bad
prot conditions. These results follow from condition (15), for any duration strictly
shorter than T the Single Contract has lower average and cumulative ring costs. Thus,
higher incentives to hire and re. Figure 5 conrms that this is the explanation. Its Panel
A proposes a cost structure violating condition (15) : And its Panel B shows that for this
new cost structure the ring boundary of permanent workers is not anymore higher in
the Single Contract. Moreover, now the Dual has lower hiring boundary.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Insert Figure 5 about here
Thus, an important message from Figures 3 and 4 is that during the temporary phase there
is less chance of being red in the Single Contract, but if the worker is red it happens before
than in the Dual Labor, when most of the ring happens at T . Overall, the higher likelihood of
hiring and lower likelihood of ring transitory workers in the Single Contract generate a higher
average time employed. As it is shown in Panel D of Figure 4.
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5 Comparative Statics
In this Section we do two things: on one side to check the robustness of the results discussed
in Section 4.2. On the other, to assess how changes in the parameters a¤ect rms ring
behavior. We start with the subjective time-discount factor (). Panels A and B of Figure
6 plot the ring boundary as a function of  at three di¤erent seniority levels ( = 6 is a
permanent worker,  = 2:5 is worker close to become permanent,  = 0:5 is a worker hired
recently). Two e¤ects are at play. On one hand more impatient rms re earlier, because
they are less willing to tradeo¤ present losses for future prots. On the other hand, high 
implies that ring costs today are more expensive relative to future prots, hence an incentive
to postpone ring. For  = 0:5 and  = 2:5 the rst e¤ect dominates and the boundary is
monotonically increasing in  for both regulations: However, for the workers with higher costs
( = 6) when  is high enough the second e¤ect dominates and more impatient rms re later.
Panel C plots the di¤erence between the ring boundaries of the Dual and the Single as a
function of  for the same three seniority levels. The Single Contract is more sensitive than the
Dual to changes in discount rates at the beginning of the employment relation. Higher  makes
the Single Contract to generate much more ring of temporary workers than the Dual. This is
a consequence of condition (15) : Firms anticipate the average cost increase and when they are
more impatient they ask for higher prots to keep the worker. The closer seniority is of T the
smaller the anticipated cost increase, what favors the Single Contract.
Insert Figure 6 about here
Figure 7 plots the ring boundary for di¤erent values of expected risk neutral prot variation
() : Intuitively, in both regulations there is less ring when rms expect higher prots. When
the deterministic drift is higher any bad prot shock will be more transitory. The shapes of
the boundaries are not a¤ected by . And Panel C shows that both regulations seem to react
similarly to changes in this parameter.
Insert Figure 7 about here
Figure 8 plots the ring boundary for di¤erent values of risk neutral prot volatility () :
Panels A and B show that the shapes of the boundaries are not a¤ected by 
Insert Figure 8 about here
An increase of  implies two opposite e¤ects: 1) As in any standard option, given that payo¤s
are asymmetric (exercise in good times, wait in bad times) an increase of the risk-neutral
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volatility enhances the value of the option to re and delays ring. 2) Firing before T is a
especial option, it is the option to re at low cost. To keep this option alive the rm cannot let
the employment duration last more than T: Thus, when higher volatility encourages the rm
to keep this option alive, the rm res sooner. E¤ect 1) dominates for our parameterization
and in Panels A and B, for both regulations, higher  reduces ring. But Panel C, shows that
e¤ect 2) is there, and it is important when comparing both regulations. Panel C plots the Dual
Labor when the cost of ring a permanent worker (the cost gap q   q) in the Dual Labor is
innite, what makes the option to re at low cost very valuable. We can see that for new hires
e¤ect 1) is still prominent, but close to T an increase of volatility induces the rm to re earlier.
This is e¤ect 2) in play, more volatile rms re sooner to keep alive the option to re cheap.
Thus, the e¤ects of  on both regulations depend crucially on the seniority of the worker.
Figure 9 plots the ring boundary for di¤erent values of the risk aversion coe¢ cient  at
two di¤erent seniority levels ( = 6 is a permanent worker,  = 0:5 is a worker hired recently):
Insert Figure 9 about here
Panels A and B show that for both seniority levels, both regulations display a non-monotonic
pattern of the ring boundary with respect to an increase in risk aversion. This is explained by
equations (5) and (6) : Higher risk-aversion lowers  via equation (6) and, initially, increases
the discount rate r of equation (5). As in Figures 6 and 7, both e¤ects push for early ring.
However, further increases of  reduce r and induce the rm to re less. Panel C reports the
di¤erence between the ring boundaries of the Dual Labor and the Single Contract. It shows
that for high levels of risk aversion the Single Contract provides less incentives to re, especially
transitory workers.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we use a real options model to study ring and hiring under two di¤erent
regulations: the Dual Labor market and the Single Contract. We focus on the option value
implied by these regulations. We show that it implies that for temporary workers the optimal
ring rule is a function of their seniority because the rm tries to keep alive the option to re
at low cost. Relative to Dual regulations, the Single Contract transfers most of the incentive to
re from workers close to become permanent to new hires. Thus, red workers are red sooner
under the Single Contract. However, if both regulations have the same average ring cost for
workers who become permanent, temporary workers are less likely to be red in the Single
Contract. Moreover, the Single Contract increases hiring and average employment duration. It
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also reduces turnover among temporary workers, but at the expense of higher turnover among
permanent workers who are more often replaced by temporary workers. These result may be
especially important in a model where workers can invest in human capital. Or in a model with
search costs or other frictions related to turnover.
Our model focused on qualitative patterns and abstracted from several dimensions important
in quantitative work, for example, di¤erentials in wage and productivity between workers of
di¤erent seniority, or general equilibrium e¤ects.
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Figures and Tables
Parameters of Prot Process Preference Parameters
 = 0:05;  = 0:14  = 0:15;  = 3
Firing and Hiring Cost Parameters
TS = T = 3; q = (40=3)  0:05; q0 = 5  0:05; q = 25  0:05; q = 45  0:05; c = 0:5q0;
Table 1. Benchmark Parameterization. This table shows the parameters used to numer-
ically solve the model and construct the gures of Section 4.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Panel A: Firing Cost Regulations
Employment Duration
Fi
rin
g 
C
os
t
Single Contract
Dual Labor
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Panel B: Optimal Firing and Hiring Boundaries
Employment Duration
P
ro
fit
s
Single Contract
Dual Labor
Figure 1. Firing Costs Regulations and Optimal Hiring and Firing Boundaries.
Panel A plots the benchmark ring cost regulations of Table 1. Panel B plots the results for those
parameterizations.
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Figure 2. Comparative Statics on the Cost of Firing a Transitory Worker. Panel
A shows the e¤ects of increasing the gap in ring costs in the Dual regulation. Panel B plots the
Single Contract for di¤erent slopes of ring costs that satisfy Conditions 12 and 14.
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Figure 3. Expected Employment Times for Fired Workers. Panel A plots the average
seniority of a worker red before becoming permanent as a function of the starting prot level. Panel
B plots the same thing for a permanent worker red within 10 years of becoming permanent:
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Figure 4. Firing and Hiring under Both Regulations. Panel A plots the probability
that an unemployed is hired before a certain time S: Panel B plots the probability that a permanent
worker is red within 10 years as a function of the prot level at which she becomes permanent. Panel
C redoes panel B but for a temporary worker red before becoming permanent, and as a function of
initial prot level. Panel D plots the average time that a worker starting at a certain prot level would
remain employed in a 15 years period.
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Figure 5. Alternative Single Contract and Optimal Hiring and Firing Bound-
aries. Panel A reports an alternative parameterization for the Single Contract that violates Condition
(15) ; while the parameterization for the Dual remains the benchmark one. Panel B plots the hiring
and ring boundaries for these two regulations.
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Figure 6. Comparative Statics: Subjective Discount Rate . Panel A plots the ring
boundaries of the Single Contract at three di¤erent seniority levels ( = 6 is a permanent worker,
 = 2:5 is a worker close to become permanent,  = 0:5 is a worker hired recently) for di¤erent values
of : Panel B redoes Panel A but for the Dual Labor. Panel C compares the Dual and the Single
Contract.
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Figure 7. Comparative Statics: Risk-Neutral Expected Prot Variation .
Panels A and B plot the ring boundaries of the Single Contract and the Dual Labor, respectively, for
di¤erent values of  as a function of seniority at the job. Panel C plots the di¤erence between the
Dual and the Single.
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Figure 8. Comparative Statics: Risk-Neutral Volatility of Prot Variation .
Panels A and B plot the ring boundaries of the Single Contract and of the Dual Labor for di¤erent
values of  as a function of seniority at the job. Panel C plots di¤erent ring boundaries of the Dual
Labor for a parameterization with innite costs of ring a permanent worker.
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Figure 9. Comparative Statics: Risk-Aversion Parameter . Panel A and B plot
the ring boundaries of the Single Contract and of the Dual Labor, respectively, with respect to the
risk aversion parameter for two di¤erent seniority levels. Panel C plots the di¤erence between both
regulations.
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